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. See also Timothy Brook, ed., Documents on the Rape of Nanking (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). 6 As several Japanese scholars have noted, there is a certain similarity in tone and content between Chang's book and the 1997 volume by the Japanese neo-nationalist cartoonist, Kobayashi Yoshinori: both simplified, self-righteous, emotional, stressing national stereotypes, and hugely popular in their respective countries. 7 Acts including killing or causing serious bodily harm to members of such group, or inflicting conditions calculated to bring about its physical destruction, to prevent births within the group, or to forcibly transfer children out of the group. See "Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," adopted by Resolution 260 (111) A of U.N. General Assembly (9 December 1948) (http://www.preventgenocide.org.law/convention/text.htm).
3 potential application. There would seem to be at least a strong a priori case for considering events in Nanjing, and elsewhere, under such a rubric. There would likewise seem to be a strong case for considering acts of the United States government at various times during this century genocidal. Was not the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for example, designed to kill the citizens of those cities because they were part of the Japanese national group? To this problem we will return.
Everyone, including all post-1945 Japanese governments, agrees that crimes were committed by imperial Japan. Where the differences arise is when it comes to locating those crimes on some comparative frame of criminality. Neither government nor non-government organizations in Japan see Japanese criminality as genocidal. The result is that the killing of six million people in the European context is regarded as more seriously criminal than that of approximately ten million in Asia, the one genocidal, the other not. Although explicit moral or legal justification is rarely given, since the suffering of the victims on all sides is equal and absolute a greater measure of evil intent is implicitly attributed to the European side.
8 Such a claim is subjective and unverifiable.
If the fabric of genocide is woven firstly out of the holocaust of the 1930s and 1940s, and secondly out of the Armenian, Cambodian, and Rwandan atrocities of the 1910s, 1970s, and 1990s, then the case for extending it to incorporate Japan must argue plausibly that the Japanese record in the 1930s and 1940s is legally and morally on a par with the Nazi, Khmer Rouge, Turkish, and Rwandan genocides, and it must also argue that it was more repugnant than the 8 Foreign visitors to the U.S. have to fill in series of forms, including one which asks as to their possible involvement in Nazi crimes, but apart from a brief, non-specific reference to countries allied to Nazi Germany, the U.S. government shows no interest in possible Japanese or other perpetrators of crimes against humanity, including genocide. In East Asia, in place of the term "genocide" the commonly used terms for great, state-sponsored killings have been terms meaning "great massacre" or "great slaughter"
(gyakusatsu or daigyakusatsu). The literal Japanese term for "genocide" --"minzoku zetsumetsu" (composed of characters meaning, literally, "racial extermination" or "national extermination"), is reserved, whether in this unfamiliar compound or in its Romanized Japanese form -"jenosaido," for discussions of Nazi war criminality or "ethnic cleansing."
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Of course, even Japanese nationalists and neo-nationalists concede that Japan may have committed "excesses." What they describe as "Japan's theocratic state under the emperor as high priest" may once have fought "a slightly high-handed patriotic war," but they believe it did not commit "crimes against humanity" such as would warrant its inclusion with Nazi Germany in the category of "historically unprecedented terror state" or "grotesque sex crime state"; Japan, they insist, is neither outlaw nor monster. To resume this introductory comment, the following are the major problems involved in any move to add imperial Japan to the select "black-list" of genocidal powers of the twentieth century:
13 Sakai Naoki, Takahashi 1. In East Asia, neither defenders nor critics of Japanese imperialism, colonialism and militarism, nor scholars who specialize in interpreting and understanding it, use the term.
2. In the China War context (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) where casualties were huge, for genocide to be proven it would have to be shown that those casualties were not the consequence of "conventional" military operations as commonly conducted by other countries at the time, but part of a design to "destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."
3. In the Korean context, Japanese colonialist policy was undoubtedly designed to destroy "Korea" as a "national group" by assimilating it within Japan. However, such measures by other twentieth century colonialist regimes have not elsewhere been held genocidal. There has been, so to speak, a colonialist exemption, and if that exemption is to be now closed both logic and morality demand that it be closed against all colonialist powers, not just Japan. In the overall context of the century, the use of the term "genocide," carrying as it does extreme legal and moral oppobrium, to describe acts The best known, and most infamous, episode in this long war was unquestionably the events of December 1937 in Nanjing, referred to by apologists as an "incident" and by others as a "massacre," "great massacre," or "rape" (the latter only rarely, and then in the romanized form rather than the Sino-Japanese term "gøkan"). In theory, at least, there would seem little difficulty in formally representing Japanese actions in Nanjing as genocidal under the terms of the U.N. definition since it was a case of killing members of a national group, with intent to destroy them "in whole or in part" because they were members of that group. The subjective experience of the residents of Nanjing (and of countless other cities, towns and villages in China subject to the operations of the Imperial Japanese Army) involved no less terror than was experienced by the What can be said of Nanjing now is the following: the Japanese army landed at
Hangzhou Bay in late November, entered the Chinese walled city of Nanjing on 12 December, conducted victory celebrations there on 17 December, and continued "mopping up" and "pacification" campaigns in neighboring districts through January of 1938. Chinese victims, both military and civilian, were many. Precise numbers cannot be known, but the Nanjing Museum's figure of 300,000 seems improbably high, inflated perhaps by righteous patriotic outrage, while conservative Japanese estimates of thirty to forty thousand are almost certainly too low, deflated by (misplaced) patriotic righteousness. The question of numbers is of course a serious one and historians rightly strive to clarify the record, but with a very few absolute denialists excepted, the emerging Japanese consensus would seem to be that around 200,000
Chinese people were killed, of whom perhaps half were "prisoners-of-war," and that the killings were either deliberate or else a spontaneous and prolonged outburst of unplanned brutality by Japanese forces, in either case with responsibility borne by the Imperial Japanese Army command and therefore the Japanese government. 16 The evidence is unequivocal that many innocent people were killed. 17 Strictly speaking, therefore, the 1948 definition would seem to cover such events but in fact, except for Chang, it has not been invoked. The event is variously seen (by nationalists and neo-nationalists) as part of the tragedy of war, or (by critics) as a "massacre," or a "great massacre."
More than sixty years after the event, the question of whether a massacre occurred in Nanjing in December 1937, and if so of what scale and character it was, is still debated in Japan. But some progress has undoubtedly been made, especially in this past decade. The idea that "Japan" in general somehow is still in "denial" mode over Nanjing, or that its school history texts still ignore it, is no longer true. Thanks to the long struggle of journalists like Honda Katsuichi, scholars like Ienaga Saburø (who fought the question of censorship of history texts in the court system for three decades), and many professional historians, a consensus has emerged on the broad outlines of the horror of 1937-38, and the "denialists" have plainly lost ground.
In the 1990s, Prime Ministers and the Emperor apologized for Japan's colonialism and aggression and referred to the massive suffering inflicted on millions of people. Textbooks were revised to incorporate, however briefly, reference to Nanjing, "Comfort Women," and other aspects of the war. 18 Various spokespersons for the government issued statements confirming official recognition that many non-combatants were killed during the capture of the Nanjing Massacre definitely happened. According to the judgment, the scale of the devastation could not be known, but it was an act of indefensible, imperialist, colonial planned aggression against the Chinese people, in clear breach of international law, and the damage and suffering it caused beyond question, for which Japan should apologize sincerely to the Chinese people. 20 It was a landmark decision, even though the court went on to declare that, while the victims deserved an apology from the government of Japan, they had no legal entitlement to redress. Some fifty cases seeking redress for wartime suffering are currently before the Japanese courts. The process may be belated, slow and sometimes equivocal, but Diet, judiciary, media, and education circles are grappling in one way or another to come to terms with the horrors of the war. However, genocide has to date formed no part of the debate, in or out of the courts, and while in Germany over 10,000 cases of Nazi war criminality have been tried in German courts (with 6,000 guilty verdicts being handed down), in Japan the notion of criminal responsibility, if considered at all, has been treated in the most abstract way.
While attention focuses on Nanjing, much of the rest of the war is forgotten. Yet the war as a whole was characterized by mayhem, slaughter, rape and arson, and the wave of violence that swept across cities and countryside around Nanjing from November 1937 to January 1938 was not qualitatively different from the rest of Japan's war on China between 1931 and 1945. Indeed the sad fact is that China as a whole was Nanjing writ large; and that 19 Nankin jiken chøsa kenky]kai, Nankin daigyakusatsu hiteiron 13 no uso, pp. 1-2.
what was different about Nanjing was that there were many observers, including foreigners, who were able to report it. In particular the countryside of North China was punctuated with mass graves, "ten thousand people pits" (wanrenkeng/banjinkø), or "people reducing kilns"
(lianrenlu/renjinro); countless villages were burned to the ground and their population either killed or driven off into walled compounds, and countless women were raped. For Chinese historians, therefore, and also for many Japanese historians, Nanjing was part of a broad movement which, in terms of deliberation and quantity, and in the context of these huge campaigns to drain the water from the pond in which the guerrillas swam, was "total war"
(though never actually declared a war, and thus prosecuted free of the inhibitions demanded by the international law of war), ruthlessly prosecuted by modern, mechanized, forces against a largely civilian, often peasant population, with immense casualties. Particularly from 1940 in North (and Central) China the official Japanese policy of rooting out resistance by a series of "absolutely extinguish, pacify and punish" operations, designed to concentrate the population in militarized encampments and to turn the open countryside into "unpopulated zones" (mujin chiku), meaning free fire zones, was understood as a policy of "three alls" ("sankø sakusen"), meaning "kill all, burn all, loot all." 21 These North China campaigns certainly merit consideration under the rubric of genocide, alongside the better-known horrors of Nanjing, but once again, the case is rarely put in those terms.
Furthermore, although the Japanese poured huge forces into China, because it was no war, but merely an "incident," no provision or plan was made for taking or holding prisoners, many of whom were ill-treated, often tortured or killed. In terms of the 1948 U.N. Convention, such acts had no legal or military justification, and therefore might be construed as committed with "intent to destroy" part of a "national group," i.e., those members of the "national group" who dissented from the Japanese agenda.
This phase of the Japanese war in China constitutes a major link in the history of 20 th century counter-guerrilla warfare that began with the U.S. efforts to crush nationalist resistance in the Philippines after the war with Spain at the beginning of the century and ended with the Russian attempts to crush Chechnyan resistance. 22 The case for viewing such counter-guerrilla operations as genocide, rather than as covered by "military exigency" seems plain enough. As
Jean-Paul Sartre observed to the Russell Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal, "the only anti-guerrilla strategy which will be effective is the destruction of the people, in other words, the civilians, women and children," i.e., torture and "genocide," exactly what he and others believed the tactic adopted by the United States in Vietnam. 23 For Japanese crimes falling under this category to be seen as genocidal, much twentieth century history of like actions would have to be reassessed too.
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Strictly speaking, the search for the criteria of genocide in Japan's pre-war regime would almost certainly concentrate on a country with which Japan was never at war: Korea. That is because it is here that the evidence for a systematic attempt to destroy a national group, the Korean nation (by assimilating it), is plain. In Korea, there is no Auschwitz or Dachau, no Nanjing or Harbin, but the independence of the Korean kingdom was extinguished in 1910 and Korea was destroyed as "a national group." An Chung-Kun, the Korean patriot who in 1909 assassinated the Japanese Regent and thus precipitated the transition, is hailed and commemorated by Koreans in both North and South as a national hero; in Japan he is reviled as a terrorist. The Japan-Korea relationship is pivotal in modern East Asian history, but cannot be understood without reference to the deep roots of the modern relationship: the sixteenth century.
The Sixteenth Century
The debate on genocide proceeds from the assumption that only "modern" events should be considered, and that it would serve no purpose for the destruction of Carthage, for example, to be declared genocidal. Yet in East Asia the burden of pre-modern history weighs heavily on the present. As the 16 th century Japanese historian, Mary Elizabeth Berry, has remarked, I have wondered whether the scale of twentieth century atrocity has reduced the gravity of our response to the past. Perhaps our attention to the institutional brutalities of modern states has also led us to slight pre-modern brutality. even if the intent was not executed. 39 A case could be made that Japan's crimes against POWs during the Second World War were extreme, and such a case has often and eloquently been argued. 40 The death rate among prisoners of the Japanese was many times higher than that among prisoners of the Nazis, although much lower than in the case of other theatres --such as the Russian and German prisoners on the eastern front in World War II. 41 It is also at least plausible that there was a plan to murder all POW survivors if Japan was defeated, and that the plan was not implemented only because of the suddenness of the final events and the breakdown of Japanese army command. 42 Certainly many POWs believed they were destined for a "final solution" when the time came. Daws concludes from his study that
[t]he Japanese were not directly genocidal in their POW camps. They did not herd their white prisoners into gas chambers and burn their corpses in ovens. But they drove them toward mass deaths all the same. They beat them until they fell, then beat them for falling, beat them until they bled, then beat them for bleeding. They denied them medical treatment. They starved them.…They sacrificed prisoners in medical experiments. They watched them die by the tens of thousands from diseases of malnutrition like beriberi, pellagra, and scurvy, and from epidemic tropical diseases: malaria, dysentery, tropical ulcers, cholera. Those who survived could only look ahead to being worked to death. If the war lasted another year, there would not have been a POW alive.
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But the POWs were by definition a multi-national, multi-ethnic group. 44 Even had they all been killed, it would therefore have amounted to a massacre, a slaughter but not genocide.
Furthermore, most agree now that the treatment of Asian POWs in Southeast Asia was substantially worse than that of Europeans, while for the Chinese, the war brought a wide range of possible outcomes: slaughter, capture and imprisonment (but as prisoners in ordinary prisons, not POW camps protected by international law), or even incorporation as part of "puppet"
forces fighting on the Japanese side. When the war in China ended, there were no prison camps
to be thrown open, few prisoners to be liberated. Whether the cause of subjecting state violence to legal sanction would be advanced by having the label of genocide attached to the treatment of the relatively small numbers of Western prisoners but not to the treatment of the masses of the people of Asia seems doubtful.
As for the problem of chemical and bacteriological warfare preparations, and partial or experimental deployment, the considerable literature on this could be summarized by saying that many atrocities were committed by Unit 731 in Harbin and its sub-branches elsewhere in 43 Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, p. 18. discriminatory pathogens to wipe out particular peoples was conducted, and in the process many lives were lost. The grand campaign to which it was oriented was never launched, however, so that it amounted perhaps to conspiracy for genocide, or planning towards genocide, rather than the thing itself (although some thousands of people nevertheless fell victim to it). To my knowledge, however, none of the experts who have worked on these matters chooses to characterize these crimes as genocidal. In any case it is necessary to recall that superpower strategy, to the end of the twentieth century and even at the beginning of the twenty-first, has been based on the development and stockpiling of weapons capable of destroying not only particular peoples but all people. Such plans may not be considered as genocidal, however, because the crime as defined in 1948 did not include the planning or working towards indiscriminate or general human slaughter, only cases in which members of a particular "national, ethical, racial or religious group" are targeted.
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To the extent that the historical record makes possible the identification of some elements of a "genocidal" or "proto-genocidal" mindset, understanding the history becomes one condition for blocking, or at least contesting, its repetition. Robert Lifton has argued that the possibility of genocidal violence becomes high in situations of what he calls "extreme historical trauma, confusion and chaos," in which there emerges "a group with a revitalizing ideology that is an analysis which seems to fit well the circumstances of the European Holocaust and also the circumstances in Turkey, Cambodia, and Rwanda, but much less obviously those of 1930s and 1940s Japan where social and political order never broke down. However, what is characteristic of the "revitalizing ideology" is the way that a line is drawn between inside and outside, "us"
and "them," so that the "designated victim" can be identified and victimized, "our" society cleansed.
The process of establishing the inside and outside of national identity involved in the pre-modern and modern Japanese case to an unusual degree the construction of "Japan" as a superior, unique, divine, blood and history-united people, different from their neighbors and destined to rule over them. The way that the line was drawn reflected a sense of vulnerability and crisis, and undoubtedly facilitated from time to time the direction of large-scale, state-directed Japanese violence against neighbors. This mentality remains strong. Japan has had consistent difficulty in conceiving of a common "Asian" identity and destiny, resorting instead to atavistic notions of unique and superior "Japanese" identity, constructed around the institution of the emperor. Though Lifton's "extreme historical trauma," of the depth that was experienced in Turkey, Germany, Cambodia, and Rwanda, has not been known in modern Japan, the ideology of Japanese superiority and uniqueness, codified in the prewar and wartime years part as "kokutai" or "national polity," persists.
Even as internationalization of the economy and political and social engagement with 46 Robert Lifton, quoted in Paul Grondahl, "Writer studies why we hate," Times Union, 2 November 2000 (http://www.timesunion.com).
the region and the world reaches unprecedented levels, so, in contrapuntal tension, does the insistence on Japan's uniqueness, as a "monoracial society" and a "natural community"
("shizen kyødøtai"), unlike polyglot countries such as the United States, mere nations "formed by contract." 47 The representation of Japan as a blood-defined nation, a "land of the gods centred on the emperor," 48 superior and distinct, on which conservative bureaucrats and politicians continue to insist, has marked similarity to the rhetoric of "ethnic cleansing"
elsewhere in the world. The movement to construct a "bright" Japan, and a "proud" Japanese identity is backed by prominent corporate as well as political and intellectual figures. Its capacity for mass mobilization is evident in the recent campaigns for text-book revision, and for Europe), and it certainly does not include any idealization of the peasant soul. 50 To the extent that contemporary Japanese identity politics is characterized by a powerful trend towards return to the formula of pre-modern and imperial Japan, the debate over "identity" thus has profound implications. Japan to concern itself with war crimes and the failure of the international community adequately to address crimes against women in particular. It formally heard evidence on the "Comfort Women" system practiced by Imperial Japan, and took some steps towards assigning responsibility for it, most notably by finding Japanese emperor (and commander-in-chief)
Hirohito, guilty. It was an important step towards the restoration of justice, human rights and dignity to the victimized women, and a pressure on the international community to end the cycle of impunity for violence against women in wartime and conflict situations. But even in this "citizen's tribunal," representing the voice of civil society from throughout the region, and making a great, late century contribution towards elucidating the problems of war, violence and gender, neither the victims, nor their legal representatives, sought recourse to the law of genocide.
The problem of drawing up a taxonomy of state-led mass killing in the twentieth century is no mere academic pursuit. More than in any other sector of criminal law the goals of punishment and deterrence are major social policy objectives. State-sponsored violence was a scourge of the twentieth century. But it is far from clear that advances in the identification, prosecution and punishment of the specific crime of genocide will serve to neutralize or block it in the twenty-first. The bedrock of the problem may be twofold. On the one hand, the crime of genocide, originally conceived and in the courts and history texts reserved for the crimes of Nazism against the Jewish people, has only slowly been expanded from the special, unique evil of the Nazi slaughter of the Jews to a general and universal category of war crime. The process does not move smoothly, and the legal and moral reasons for singling out one particular form of state violence, genocide, from others such as politicide, gynocide, etc., is not clear. On the other hand, the twentieth century is too rich in precedents of "victor's justice," where the acts of the defeated were declared utterly depraved (and genocidal) while similar acts on the part of the 30 victor were justified. Both of these problems cast a shadow over the effort to achieve generalized justice and to punish and deter all forms of state violence.
31

